SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT:
The report was brought to our attention by the Libyan News List.
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and join the discussion: Should the US and the UK agree to an international
trial in the Netherlands ?
SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT:QADDAFI, LOCKERBIE, AND PROSPECTS FOR LIBYA 15. October 1998 This excerpt is taken from the report issued by the The Washington Institute for Near East Policy October the1st 1998. The report is not an objective scientific approach using the logics of induction, rather than an outline of the present American governmental view on the Lockerbie Crisis in particular and the American-Libyan political relations in general. This report is based mostly on allegation, rumors and vague perceptions and should not be regarded as 100 % truthful. However, it gives the reader a clue to the present American governmental view on the Libyan sanctions-warfare.
The report was brought to our attention by the Libyan News List.And should Libya extradite the two suspects for trial ? Who was behind the crash of Pan Am 103 ? Lockerbie Crisis Discussion Room - your opinion !
Washington Institute : POLICYWATCH
Number 342 - October 1, 1998SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT
QADDAFI, LOCKERBIE, AND PROSPECTS FOR LIBYARAY TAKEYH AND GIDEON ROSE
On September 23, Dr. Ray Takeyh, a research fellow at the University of California at Berkeley, and Dr. Gideon Rose, deputy director of national security studies and Olin fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, addressed The Washington Institute's Policy Forum on the current situation in Libya and its effect on U.S. policy. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.
RAY TAKEYHLibya's economic decomposition has led to the rise of an Islamic opposition.
(talk about islamic movements in Libya and American based analysis on that topic)
The Lockerbie Trial and Libya's Future.
There is an internal debate in Libya regarding the turning over of the suspects in the 1988 bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Revolutionary Committees say Libya should hold tight and not compromise with the international regime. In contrast, other elements of the Libyan elite -- including Qaddafi's brother-in-law, Abdullah al-Sanusi, who was implicated in the subsequent bombing of UTA flight
772 and who is regarded one of the masterminds of the Lockerbie bombing -- are essentially pressing for some sort of compromise. The latter group does not necessarily advocate turning over the suspects, but rather a prolonged process of negotiations which, they hope, will erode the viability of the sanctions regime. Such a process would be better for Qaddafi, who is closer to the pragmatic faction, than would the actual outcome of negotiations. Qaddafi would not want his sponsorship of international terrorism to be revealed publicly in the course of a fair trial, which is why he most likely will not turn over the suspects. If any individuals were found guilty of crimes of international terrorism, that would enhance an American call for an embargo of Libyan oil, which is what Qaddafi fears most.As regards Libya's future, there is a discernible change in the mood of the population, from passivity to resistance. If Qaddafi were replaced, the most likely source of the change would be the armed forces. Islam will play a pivotal role in any succession crisis in Libya. Anyone who will inherit the state after Qaddafi's death will require the legitimacy that only Islam can provide. At least a dozen coup attempts, most recently in November 1996, attest to the unreliability of the Libyan army. In a 1993 coup attempt led by the army, Qaddafi had to call in the air force to suppress the ground forces. The Libyan armed forces have felt an increasing alienation in recent years for a number of reasons: Qaddafi has cut the military budget, which has primarily affected the ground forces; Qaddafi has tried to reduce the size of the armed forces by militarizing the purification committees and popular militias as a counterbalance to the armed forces; finally, he is attempting to reduce the human base of his army by relying more on chemical and possibly nuclear weapons for an assertive foreign policy.
GIDEON ROSE
The choice of a U.S. policy toward Libya is not one of absolute good, but one of balancing the pros and cons of several alternatives. America's troubles with Libya began in the 1970s after Qaddafi decided to devote a significant portion of his country's oil revenues to sponsoring revolution abroad, suppressing his enemies, and supporting terrorism. The question posed to the United States ever since has been what to do with a country that engages in occasional criminal behavior directed at U.S. national interests a nd at regional stability, yet which is not a vital threat to national interests and which remains an attractive commercial partner for both U.S. firms and those of America's allies. Extreme responses such as appeasement or overall invasion of Libya have quickly been dismissed, and the U.S. government instead has decided to adopt a policy of limited sanctions and modest containment.
Sanctions.
The sanctions against Libya have come in three phases. The first phase began in the 1970s and ended in 1991. During that period, the United States embarked on a relatively lonely campaign to wage economic war against Libya and isolate it. The United States imposed a unilateral economic embargo and tried to persuade other countries to do the same. However, it was not successful with its campaign.
The second phase of the sanctions began when evidence emerged linking Libya to the Lockerbie and UTA bombings. Had the revelations appeared soon after the bombings, there is little doubt that there would
have been a major military response. As it happened, Libya's involvement was divulged only years after the Lockerbie bombings, by which time the immediate passions about the attacks had cooled off -- except for those of the victims' families. Consequently, the United States, Great Britain, and France opted for a diplomatic solution. The dilemma was that many European countries wanted to maintain their economic relations with Libya. The compromise solution was relatively minor sanctions, including an air travel ban and a ban on arms sales.The third phase started in 1996 when Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), an attempt to coerce allied countries into joining U.S. policies by threatening to enact a variety of secondary sanctions. ILSA was basically about Iran, but it came to include Libya as well. Yet there was no real change in the Libyan situation which would have required a stepped-up pressure. Ironically, when a deal was cut in May 1998 to return to the pre-ILSA status quo with regard to Iran, no explicit mention was made of Libya. Nevertheless, it is highly possible that, should there be any future crisis in the Libyan investment area, the U.S. government would probably cut some kind of deal to avoid a trans-Atlantic trade war over Libya.
Lockerbie.
In August 1998, the U.S. and British governments announced their agreement to allow the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing to be tried in The Hague, although in accordance with Scottish law and by Scottish judges. As Qaddafi had previously agreed to this arrangement, there is a chance that some kind of trial might actually take place in the near future.
A major reason for the recent developments in the Lockerbie case is the doubts about whether the pre-ILSA status quo can be sustained much longer. There has been a general sanctions fatigue, particularly among members of the Arab League and the nonaligned movement. Signals of an erosion of the sanctions regime merged with other signals that seemed to be emanating from Libya, indicating that Qaddafi might have decided to return to international respectability by letting the suspects try their chances in court. As to the U.S. and British policy, it is very unlikely that the two governments will increase pressure on Libya, as
there are too many forces that object to such a move. The likeliest outcome is that the current policy will be maintained, which is the one solution that places Libya at about the right level in terms of the overall threat it poses to U.S. interests.This Special Policy Forum Report was prepared by Assaf Moghadam.
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