Today,
as the U.S. spearheads the U.N.-sanctioned embargo against Libya for not
handing over two suspects in the bombing, Mrs. McKee wonders if Chuck's
background contains the secret of why this plane was targeted. If her suspicions
are correct, Washington may not be telling the entire story. Major Charles
Dennis McKee, called ''Tiny'' by his Army intelligence friends, was a burly
giant and a superstar in just about every kind of commando training offered
to American military personnel. He completed the rugged Airborne and Ranger
schools, graduated first in his class from the Special Forces qualification
course, and served with the Green Berets. In Beirut he was identified merely
as a military attache assigned to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). But his hulking physique didn't fit such a low- profile diplomatic
post. Friends there remember him as a ''walking arsenal'' of guns and knives.
His real assignment reportedly was to work with the CIA in reconnoitering
the American hostages in Lebanon and then, if feasible, to lead a daring
raid that would rescue them.TO GATHER FURTHER EVIDENCE that the bomb was not contained in an unaccompanied
bag from Malta, Pan Am lawyer Shaughnessy recently interviewed under oath
20 officials who were in Malta on Dec. 21, 1988, including the airport
security commander, the bomb-disposal engineer who inspected all the baggage,
the general manager of ground operations of Air Malta, the head loader
of Flight 180 and the three check-in agents. Their records showed that
no unaccompanied suitcases were put aboard the flight, and some of the
staff Shaughnessy interviewed are prepared to testify under oath that there
was no bag that day destined for Pan Am Flight 103.
Although Shaughnessy subpoenaed the FBI, CIA, DEA and four other government
agencies for all documents pertaining to both the bombing of Flight 103
and the narcotics sting operation, he has been repeatedly rebuffed by the
Justice Department for reasons of national security. Even so, with the
help of investigators hired after Aviv, he has managed to obtain some of
the documents needed to defend Pan Am's insurers in the trial scheduled
to begin April 27 at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York.
The stakes are enormous, and the incentive is high for Shaughnessy
to demonstrate the government's responsibility for the bombing. In addition
to defending against the compensation claims of $7 billion, he is bringing
a claim against the government for failing to give warning that Pan Am
had been targeted by the terrorists. The man who has been Shaughnessy's
key witness in these proceedings is hiding in fear of his life in a small
town in Europe.
His real name is Lester Knox Coleman III, although as a former spy
for the dia and DEA he was known as Thomas Leavy and by the code name Benjamin
B.
A year ago, the stockily built, bearded Coleman filed an affidavit
describing the narcotics sting operation that Shaughnessy claims was infiltrated
by Jibril. It wasn't until July 1990, when Coleman spotted a newspaper
picture of one of the Pan Am victims and recognized the young Lebanese
as one of his drug- running informants, that he realized he might be of
assistance to Pan Am. He was also looking for work. Two months earlier
he had been deactivated by the DIA after being arrested by the FBI for
using his DIA cover name, Thomas Leavy, on a passport application. Coleman
claims that the DIA instructed him to do this. ''But such trumped-up
charges are frequently used to keep spooks quiet,'' says A. Ernest
Fitzgerald, a Pentagon whistle-blower and a director of the Fund for Constitutional
Government in Washington, which has been looking into Coleman's case. Coleman
spent three days in jail. His official pretrial services report, filed
with the U.S. District Court of Illinois for the Northern District, began,
''Although Mr. Coleman's employment history sounds quite improbable,
information he gave has proven to be true.''
Raised in Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia, Coleman, now 48, was
recruited by the dia and assigned to the still classified humint (Human
Intelligence) MC-10 operation in the Middle East. In early 1987 he was
transferred from Lebanon to Cyprus, where he began his work for the DEA.
However, he says he was instructed not to inform the DEA there of his role
as a DIA undercover agent. By this time even the DIA suspected that the
freewheeling narcotics sting operation was getting out of hand. In Nicosia,
Coleman saw the supposedly controlled shipments of heroin, called kourah
in Lebanon -- inspiration for the CIA operation's code name COREA -- grow
into a torrent.
The drugs were delivered by couriers who arrived on the overnight ferry
from the Lebanese port of Jounieh. After receiving their travel orders
from the DEA, the couriers were escorted to the Larnaca airport by the
Cypriot national police and sent on their way to Frankfurt and other European
transit points.
The DEA testified at hearings in Washington that no ''controlled deliveries''
of drugs through Frankfurt were made in 1988. Coleman's DEA front in Nicosia,
called the Eurame Trading Co. Ltd., was located on the top floor of a high-rise
apartment near the U.S. embassy. He says the intelligence agency paid him
with unsigned Visa traveler's checks issued by B.C.C.I. in Luxembourg.
Additionally, the DEA country attache in Cyprus, Michael Hurley, kept a
drawer full of cash in his office at the embassy, which he parceled out
to Coleman and to a parade of confidential informants, known by such nicknames
as ''Rambo Dreamer,'' ''Taxi George'' and ''Fadi the Captain.''
Hurley admitted in a Justice Department affidavit that he paid Coleman
$74,000 for information. The informants, Coleman reported, were under the
control of Ibrahim el-Jorr. ''He was a Wild West character who wore
cowboy boots and tooled around in a Chevy with expired Texas plates,''
he says. ''I was told ((by el-Jorr)) that in the Frankfurt airport the
suitcases containing the narcotics were put on flights to the U.S. by agents
or other sources working in the baggage area. From my personal observation,
Germany's BKA ((Bundeskriminalamt, the German federal police)) was also
involved, as was Her Majesty's Customs and Excise service in the United
Kingdom.''
After deciding to become a witness for Pan Am, Coleman phoned a friend,
Hartmut Mayer, a German intelligence agent in Cyprus, and asked if he knew
how the bomb got aboard Flight 103. Mayer suggested calling a ''Mr. Harwick''
and a ''Mr. Pinsdorf,'' who Mayer said were running the investigation at
the Frankfurt airport. ''I spoke with Pinsdorf,'' says Coleman.
''From his conversation I learned that BKA had serious concerns that
the drug sting operation originating in Cyprus had caused the bomb to be
placed on the Pan Am plane.''
Mayer and Pinsdorf gave depositions last year at the request of Pan
Am. But the German Federal Ministry of the Interior ruled they couldn't
discuss law-enforcement matters relating to other nations. Mayer did say
he knew Coleman. ''It took three informants just to keep tabs on al-Kassar,''
claims Coleman. He said the informants reported that al-Kassar and the
Syrian President's brother Rifaat Assad were taking over drug production
in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, under protection of the Syrian army. Coleman
also says he learned that the principal European transfer point for their
heroin shipments was the Frankfurt airport.
In December 1988 al-Kassar picked up some news that threatened to shut down his smuggling operation. Charles McKee's counterterrorist team in Beirut that was investigating the possible rescue of the nine American hostages had got wind of his CIA connection. The team was outraged that the COREA unit in Wiesbaden was doing business with a Syrian who had close terrorist connections and might endanger their planned rescue attempt. Besides McKee, a key member of the team was Matthew Gannon, 34, the CIA's deputy station chief in Beirut and a rising star in the agency. After venting their anger to the CIA in Langley about al-Kassar, McKee and Gannon were further upset by headquarters' failure to respond. Its silence was surprising because Gannon's father-in-law Thomas Twetten, who now commands the CIA's worldwide spy network, was then chief of Middle East operations based in Langley. He was also Ollie North's CIA contact.
MCKEE AND GANNON, joined by three other members of the team, decided to fly back to Virginia unannounced and expose the COREA unit's secret deal with al- Kassar. They packed $500,000 in cash provided for their rescue mission, as well as maps and photographs of the secret locations where the hostages were being held. Then the five-man team booked seats on Pan Am 103 out of London, arranging to fly there on a connecting flight from Cyprus.
McKee's mother says she is sure her son's sudden decision to fly home
was not known to his superiors in Virginia. ''This was the first time
Chuck ever telephoned me from Beirut,'' she says. ''I was flabbergasted.
'Meet me at the Pittsburgh airport tomorrow night,' he said. 'It's a surprise.'
Always before he would wait until he was back in Virginia to call and say
he was coming home.''
Apparently the team's movements were being tracked by the Iranians.
A story that appeared in the Arabic newspaper Al-Dustur on May 22, 1989,
disclosed that the terrorists set out to kill McKee and his team because
of their planned hostage-rescue attempt. The author, Ali Nuri Zadeh, reported
that ''an American agent known as David Love-Boy ((he meant Lovejoy)),
who had struck bargains on weapons to the benefit of Iran,'' passed information
to the Iranian embassy in Beirut about the team's travel plans. Reported
to be a onetime State Department security officer, Lovejoy is alleged to
have become a double agent with CIA connections in Libya. His CIA code
name was said to be ''Nutcracker.''
Lawyer Shaughnessy uncovered similar evidence. His affidavit, filed
with the federal district court in Brooklyn, New York, asserts that in
November and ; December 1988 the U.S. government intercepted a series of
telephone calls from Lovejoy to the Iranian charge d'affaires in Beirut
advising him of the team's movements.
Lovejoy's last call came on Dec. 20, allegedly informing the Iranians
that the team would be on Pan Am Flight 103 the following day.
In his book, Lockerbie: The Tragedy of Flight 103, Scottish radio
reporter David Johnston disclosed that British army searches of the wreckage
recovered more than $500,000 cash, believed to belong to the hostage-rescue
team, and what appeared to be a detailed plan of a building in Beirut,
with two crosses marking the location of the hostages. The map also pinpointed
the positions of sentries guarding the building and contained a description
of how the building might be taken. Johnston also described how CIA agents
helicoptered into Lockerbie shortly after the crash seeking the remnants
of McKee's suitcase.
''Having found part of their quarry,'' he wrote, ''the CIA
had no intention of following the exacting rules of evidence employed by
the Scottish police. They took the suitcase and its contents into the chopper
and flew with it to an unknown destination.'' Several days later the
empty suitcase was returned to the same spot, where Johnston reported that
it was ''found'' by two British Transport Police officers, ''who in
their ignorance were quite happy to sign statements about the case's discovery.''
Richard Gazarik, a reporter for the Greensburg, Pennsylvania, Tribune- Review, spent many months probing the major's secret mission. He found, hidden inside the lining of McKee's wallet, which was retrieved from the Pan Am wreckage and returned to his mother, what he assumes was McKee's code name, Chuck Capone, and the gangster code names (Nelson, Dillinger, Bonnie and Clyde) of the other team members.
The theory that Jibril targeted Flight 103 in order to kill the hostage-
rescue team is supported by two independent intelligence experts. M. Gene
Wheaton, a retired U.S. military-intelligence officer with 17 years' duty
in the Middle East, sees chilling similarities between the Lockerbie
crash and the suspicious DC-8 crash in Gander, Newfoundland, which killed
248 American soldiers in 1985.
Wheaton is serving as investigator for the families of the victims
of that crash. ''A couple of my old black ops buddies in the Pentagon
believe the Pan Am bombers were gunning for McKee's hostage-rescue team,''
he says. ''But they were told to shift the focus of their investigation
because it revealed an embarrassing breakdown in security.''
The FBI says it investigated the theory that McKee's team was targeted
and found no evidence to support it. Victor Marchetti, former executive
assistant to the CIA's deputy director and co-author of The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence, believes that the presence of the team on Flight
103 is a clue that should not be ignored.
His contacts at Langley agree.
''It's like the loose thread of a sweater,'' he says. ''Pull
on it, and the whole thing may unravel.'' In any case, Marchetti believes
the bombing of Flight 103 could have been avoided. ''The Mossad knew
about it and didn't give proper warning,'' he says. ''The CIA knew
about it and screwed up.''
The CIA may still be trying to find out more information about why McKee
and Gannon suddenly decided to fly home.
Last year three CIA agents, reportedly following up on their hostage-rescue
mission, were shot dead in a Berlin hotel while waiting to meet a Palestinian
informant.
Beulah McKee has given up trying to find out if Pan Am's bombers were
after her son, although she says, ''The government's secrecy can't close
off my mind.'' Twice she called and questioned Gannon's widow Susan,
who like her husband and her father Tom Twetten worked for the CIA. ''The
last time, I was accused of opening my mouth too much,'' says Mrs.
McKee.
Yet memories die hard, and mothers never quite get accustomed to losing
a child. Beulah McKee keeps her son's bedroom all tidied up, as if she
still expected him to come home. His pictures, diplomas, miltary awards,
even his chrome-plated bowie knife, decorate the walls. In a cardboard
carton under the made-up bed are the heavily censored service records of
her son, which may contain the secret of why Pan Am 103 was blown out of
the sky over Scotland.
ROY ROWAN, COVER STORIES: PAN AM 103 WHY DID THEY DIE? Washington says Libya sabotaged the plane. Provocative evidence suggests that a Syrian drug dealer may have helped plant the bomb -- and the real targets we., TIME, 04-27-1992, pp 24.
The TIME article caused considerate reactions among relatives and other people involved into the crash of Pan Am 103 and the investigation. TIME MAGAZINE received (and receives still!) many comments, letters and messages regarding this article. Even a libel suit had been filed against TIME from the side of relatives.
LETTERS: PAN AM 103., TIME, 05-18-1992, pp 8.
''Are we once again left simply to accept deception from the U.S.
government?''
Jim Fitzpatrick
Santa Barbara, Calif.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE WILL PROBABLY never know if the material in
TIME's skillfully detailed article on Pan Am 103 is true ((COVER
STORIES, April 27)). As in so many similar situations in the dismal
past, those who demand access to the facts will be stonewalled by a
chorus of protests that it ''endangers the national security.'' With
so many covert cowboys running unchecked around the world -- myriad
agencies conducting their operations at cross-purposes, untold
bungling that can be conveniently covered up, an entire intelligence
community operating with no accountability -- Washington should wake
up! This is the threat to national security!
Kenneth C. Banes
Westtown, N.Y.
EVEN DURING THOSE TERRIBLE FIRST hours after the Pan Am explosion
over Lockerbie, Scotland, it was obvious that the hunt for the
bombers was going to be incredibly difficult. As a journalist, I have
become dedicated to seeking the truth. For more than three years,
information sources pointed to a connection involving Syria, Iran and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.
When warrants were issued charging two Libyans with the bombing, I
was deeply disturbed. To point at Libya, despite frenetic denials,
was the biggest volte-face in history. It was very convenient, given
the scenario that it was necessary to reward Syria for its support in
the gulf war. Roy Rowan's article has shed some very powerful light
in some very dark corners.
David Ben-Aryeah
Edinburgh
I, ALONG WITH MANY OTHER KIN OF THE 248 men and women killed in
the plane that crashed at Gander, Newfoundland, in 1985, have been
requesting, imploring, begging the U.S. government to find the real
cause of the untimely death of hundreds of America's best, including
my youngest son. I sold some of my war souvenirs to pay my fare to
testify before a congressional subcommittee and plead with its
members to tell the next of kin the reasons for that tragedy. But,
except for a very few, no one is listening.
Lewis Lee Millett Sr.
Colonel, U.S.A. (ret.)
Idyllwild, Calif.
TIME ASKS ME TO ACCEPT THE PREMISE that the government is
smuggling drugs into the U.S. in order to establish credibility with
foreign governments that would then presumably have provided us with
a chance to rescue American hostages. You ask me to believe our
government knows the real reason this plane, these lives, were
destroyed. Are we once again left simply to accept deception from the
U.S. government? It's time for the truth to every story.
Jim Fitzpatrick
Santa Barbara, Calif.
WOULDN'T IT HAVE MADE SENSE FOR A terrorist group to say openly
that the reason for committing a murderous act was to kill
intelligence agents, on the assumption that this claim would then put
some blame on the U.S. government? Why would terrorists keep this a
secret, allowing the world to think they were targeting innocent
civilians?
Valerie A. Campbell
Upland, Calif.
THE U.S. TREATS ALL THE UNPLEASANT Muslim leaders as if they were
Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Terrorists must be punished, and
justice must prevail; the world has not forgotten the brutal attack
by the U.S. on an Iranian Airbus that caused 298 deaths in 1988.
Where was justice then? Your articles seem to have an anti-Islamic
tinge.
Tariq A. Rana
Lahore, Pakistan