This paper is meant to be an analysis of the USG's decision to impose somewhat weak, unilateral sanctions designed to "seek full compliance by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United Nations, including ending all support for acts of international terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction,"(1) especially in light of Libya's noncompliance with the UN sanctions. The paper will use concepts introduced in Political Science 472 and through other sources, specifically the concepts of deterrence, rationality, unitary actors, bureaucratic politics, prospect theory, and the "rogue doctrine," to assess these primary questions: Why did the United States decide to impose sanctions on the state of Libya, with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, and will those sanctions be effective?
The first concept of international security relations relevant to this paper is deterrence. Deterrence has been central to American foreign policy in the post-World War II era, and especially since the end of the Cold War, in which the United States is the only remaining superpower. There are two types of deterrence: deterrence by threat and deterrence by denial. Relevant to this paper is deterrence by denial, defined as "a process of denying another party the ability to take an action by altering the relative capabilities of the parties."(2) With the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, the USG is attempting to prohibit Libya's sponsorship of international terrorism and its efforts to acquire or produce weapons of mass destruction by denying it the ability to contract with others concerning its petroleum industry development (its largest industry(3).) In doing so, Libya's ability to perform the outlawed acts would diminish with the lack of oil revenue.
The success of a deterrent threat depends largely on the rationality of the threat's initiator and target. According to rational choice theory, a decision maker who is able to make an evaluation of the optimal choice by weighing possible costs or gains of an action is proximately rational.(4) The less rational an actor, the more likely he is not able to fully evaluate his choices and hence cannot be held accountable for his actions. Deterrent threats by irrational actors will not be effective, because the threats are not sufficiently evaluated and weighed for expected value. Deterrent threats will not be effective on irrational actors, because those actors will not be able to weigh possible losses and thus cannot evaluate the most efficient choice for a given situation. Hence it is important to determine whether or not Libya and the United states are rational; rationality will have an effect on the deterrent success of the economic sanctions.
Some theorists find that decision-makers do not always make rational choices. Instead, they can be bound in their choices by other cognitive factors which constrain the actor from making a rational choice. For instance, leaders may turn aside information that heightens value conflict such as ignoring, discounting, denying, or misinterpreting information; they may choose satisfactory outcomes over optimal outcomes; and they may allow their adherence to ideology color their decisions (the last two are particularly relevant to this case.) All of these "cognitive shortcuts" to decisions can lead to misperception in the evaluation process, thereby decreasing the likelihood of the efficient choice being picked and thus decreasing deterrence success itself. Often times, leaders and decision makers are motivated to see information in a certain light, because doing so helps to serve some goal or purpose that is important to them. These motivated biases can lead to irrational decisions.(5) While such information on biases and rationality with respect to Libya is hard to find, whether or not the USG was or is irrational or motivated to impose sanctions will give important insight on the sanctions' effectiveness. Especially important will be whether or not US ideology motivated decision makers to see sanctions as effective.
One theory designed to explain foreign policy decisions is the bureaucratic politics theory. This theory proposes that actors within a bureaucracy (in the United States, these actors would be the President, Congress, the State Department, and the Department of Defense) "see different faces of issues, propose competing ways to resolve value conflicts, and have varying time horizons for action success."(6) Misperception plays a central role in bureaucratic politics, as many interpretations of a threat (when receiving one) or many enunciated positions on a threat (when giving one) can foster mixed signals about those threats. Thus, whether or not the giver or receiver of the threat is a unitary actor (i.e., not subject to bureaucratic decision-making) is very important to the success of deterrence, and in this case the success of the economic sanctions.(7) This paper will attempt to discern either unitary or bureaucratic characteristics of both Libya and the United States.
Another theory used to describe decisions in foreign policy draws heavily on the idea that decision makers are not rational. This theory, prospect theory, states that a decision maker's preoccupation (bias) with loss avoidance affects the rationality of the choice. A loss is more painful than an equivalent gain is desirable. If leaders are motivated by fears of loss -- if they operate from a "basement of fear and felt needs" -- they will make decisions which seemingly satisfy this fear but in reality may not.(8) In this case deterrence via economic sanctions would be less likely to be successful if the US decision makers were motivated by the fear of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed Libya did try to acquire nuclear weapons in the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1975. Qadaffi's need stemmed from the felt need to equal the nuclear capacity of arch-enemy Israel. He looked to a number of countries, including the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, Belgium, and Germany. The Soviet Union provided Libya with a 10 megawatt research reactor in 1979, but did not provide satisfactory support to the Libyan program. Libya then tried to negotiate a US$1 billion deal with a Belgian firm, but that company withdrew its contract in the face of strong US pressure.(12) Since this second failed effort, Libya has not again tried to acquire nuclear weapons, even though it has "professed a willingness to commit vast funds to these efforts."(13)
Libya has been much more successful in its pursuit of chemical weapons. In 1988, Libya was found to be constructing a chemical weapons plant at Rabta, one which is now the largest such facility in the Third World,(14) providing what American officials viewed as a significant threat to American strategic interests in the area, and also threatening other neighboring nations. Libya possesses some short-range SCUD missiles, but it is not known whether these have been equipped with chemical warheads. If so, these weapons could be used against neighboring nations or against factions within Libya.(15)
Libya's primary vehicle for fulfilling its international ambitions comes through the sponsorship of numerous terrorist and insurgent organizations. The primary support goes to groups which are revolutionary and anti-Western in orientation. These include Muslim insurgents in the Philippines, the Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red Army, and the Islamic fundamentalist Fatah Revolutionary Council of Abu Nidal, as well as insurgents in Chad, Niger, Algeria, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and other African countries.(16) Some of the more prominent Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks brought US and UN responses. The first was a bombing of a Berlin discotheque frequented by US servicemen in 1986. One US soldier was killed and 204 others were injured. In retaliation, the US launched air strikes on Tripoli and other sites. The strikes were meant to provoke the Libyan military into turning against Qadaffi, but only served to strengthen his command by showing that he could withstand an American attack.(17) Qadaffi came to regard the US as the leader of Western imperialism/capitalism, and he vigorously opposed any Western presence in the Middle East and North Africa. Any resistance to this power by Arabs was seen as a major victory.
The most notorious incident of Libyan-sponsored terrorism came with the bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Two Libyan intelligence agents planted a bomb which killed 270 people in all. The two were indicted in 1991 in the United States, but Libya has subsequently refused to turn over the two suspects for extradition, prompting the United Nations to impose sanctions in Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 demanding their return and compliance.(18)
Despite the UN sanctions, as well as prior US sanctions, Libya has yet to turn over the suspects. They also continue to sponsor terrorist groups, especially Abu Nidal. Libya is still active in harboring and training Palestinian radical factions who are resistant to the Arab-Israeli peace process.(19) Abu Nidal is still headquartered in Libya. Equally important is Libya's continued drive to build a sizable chemical weapons arsenal. US intelligence agents report that "Libya is close to completing the world's largest underground chemical weapons plant with the ability to produce tons of poison gas a day."(20) The plant at the desert site of Tarhunah poses a special problem for Western intelligence, because is not able to be photographed from satellite, and is almost impenetrable to air strikes. The plant is expected to be operational sometime in 1997.
President Clinton has also stated that these two interests are of prime importance to the American people. Through a series of White House press releases and speeches by the president, Clinton has affirmed that he too believes stopping the terrorist and proliferation threats are hugely important to American national security. In a fact sheet dated April 30, 1996, before the passage of the Act, the White House stated that "counter-terrorism is a top priority for the Clinton Administration as it has sought aggressively to track down and punish terrorists worldwide and to fight international crime to the fullest extent of the law."(24) It also discusses the need to hold tight to existing sanctions against Libya. Another fact sheet outlines the Administration's strategy to fight international terrorism. It is rhetorically significant for the fact that it mentions America's moral, ideological obligation to lead the fight against terrorism. It says, "Our responsibility is to do everything we can to prevent terrorist attacks, to bring to justice those who commit them, and above all, to never let terrorism stop us from moving forward with our lives."(25) As a reiteration of the Administration's policy on the bill, in a September 24, 1996 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the president argued that the greatest threats to freedom and security will come from rogue states, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.(26)
Similar statements from the Department of Defense indicate that it believes the denial of terrorism and prevention of WMD proliferation are very important in the assessment of national security. Secretary of Defense Perry said that the US "will not let acts of terror intimidate us into abandoning any of our vital security partners in the Middle East... The American people must be committed to fighting extremism and hate wherever we find it."(27) The Department of Defense has reorganized its entire structure to respond to threats from rogue states, clearly indicating that it views the threats as significantly important.(28)
What can be drawn from the enunciated views of the different entities that make up the American foreign policy bureaucracy is that, though these groups may have been motivated by different factors, their views converged on the need to sanction Libya in an attempt to change its actions and convince it not to remain on its current course. With the convergence of viewpoints, the US can be said to have acted in a unitary, and not bureaucratic, manner towards Libya, and thus did not decrease the chance of deterrence success by sending conflicting, mixed signals.
In the theoretical orientation, the unitary nature of the target country was also discussed as important with respect to deterrence success. Libya must be viewed as a unitary government. Qadaffi does not currently have any internal threat to his power strong enough to possibly remove him, despite the fact that coup attempts have occurred in the past. He has put down all rebellion, and would more than likely withstand any insurgence from within. Qadaffi exercises absolute control over the affairs of the country from a non-political post, and at times has enjoyed enormous popular support -- especially in the defiance of Western and American attempts at engagement. It is sufficient to say that he is in charge of Libya's foreign policy.
The authority used to impose the economic sanctions comes from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. §§1701-6.) This act allows for economic sanctions to be applied in the event of a declared national emergency; President Clinton has declared emergencies (and continued them with communications to Congress) in Executive Order 12543 (concerning Libya's non-compliance with UN sanctions) and in Executive Order 12938 (concerning the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.) IEEPA provides a statutory basis for sanctions.(29)
Yet the Act comes under immediate suspicion due to its unilateral and extraterritorial nature. The specific sanctions of the Act can be imposed on any person (or company, institution, etc.) from any country found to be involved in violating the Act's provisions. There is no question that this Act should apply to Americans and American nationals -- US v. Crews (1985) states that any country may apply its body of law to its citizens anywhere in the world (605 F.Supp 730.) The Act goes beyond American nationals and implies that this law is also applicable to non-US citizens and corporations. However, the "United States does not have jurisdiction to enforce its laws, i.e. to take measures directed towards compliance, on another nation's sovereignty, absent consent by the other nation."(30) The fact that the Act imposes unilateral sanctions reveals that no other nation has authorized the USG to impose its will on that country's nationals and hence infringe upon the sovereignty of that country. According to the Law of Nations, a state that initiates counter-measures to acts must ensure that they do not infringe upon the property rights of a third state and her nationals.(31) Also, a state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over persons and property within her own domain to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the other states;(32) imposing sanctions on another state's nationals infringes on that state's rights to have control over its own nationals.
This extraterritorial assertion by the USG has been strongly criticized by other nations, including many US allies. The European Union , in its "Report on US Barriers to Trade and Investment 1996," discusses American extraterritoriality and unilateralism, saying that they "hamper international trade and investment by seeking to regulate [third parties]" and that unilateral sanctions "undermine the internationally agreed-[upon] system of trade rules embodied in the WTO."(33) The measure, along with Helms-Burton Act, has been lambasted in the foreign press. Europeans feel that the USG's newfound contempt for multilateralism weakens the legitimacy of international multilateral actions, such as UN Security Council Resolutions. Indeed one US ally, Turkey, has already tested the law by signing a US$23 billion, 23-year deal with Iran to purchase natural gas -- and the deal was signed just one week after the Act was signed by Clinton.(34)
One factor already mentioned that will diminish the sanction's effectiveness and raises questions about the USG's rationality is the very questionable legality of the unilateral sanctions. These sanctions have already been challenged by American allies; there is no reason to believe they will not continue to be challenged. Their unilateral nature diminished their international legitimacy and thus the credibility of the US deterrent threat. An overt challenge to the law one week after its signing no doubt shows others that the sanctions are weak, and that other nations should not be afraid to challenge the status quo.
Another factor that raises questions about the USG's rationality is the historical ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in changing foreign policy goals of target countries. In an expansive study on the effects of economic sanctions, it was found that "in most cases, sanctions do not contribute very much to the achievement of foreign policy goals"(35) and "at most there is a weak correlation between economic depravation and the political willingness to change. Sanctions are seldom effective in... bringing major changes in the domestic policies of the target country."(36) The results of this survey lead one to conclude that economic sanctions do not work for rehabilitative purposes; to impose sanctions for that reason is not a rational choice.
There are also indications that motivated biases colored America's decisions. Aside from the biases governing the defense industry as outlined in the Klare book, some others are worth noting. Motivated biases are probably at work in this case for two reasons: the relative capabilities of Libya are negligible when compared to the United States, and Libya's resolve to use terrorist methods has not been as strong since the PanAm bombing. Though Libya is currently constructing a new chemical weapons plant at Tarhunah, the plant is not yet operational. In addition, Libya lacks the delivery mechanisms needed to bring chemical weapons over long distances. The history of Libyan military interactions with the United States, though brief, show them to be vastly inferior in military terms.(37)
The various actors are motivated by the need to see the Libyan threat as a grave concern; in actuality, the threat is very limited. Congress and the President are motivated by the constituents' (and the media's) heavy emphasis on terrorist threats. All actors are motivated by enunciated commitments to the idea that terrorism and proliferation must be resisted at all costs, and that it is the moral obligation of the USG as a world leader to combat these threats.(38) Backing down from such rhetorical commitments not only reduces credibility abroad in the eyes of potential aggressors, but also undermines domestic political credibility by showing signs of weakness in dealing with demonized threats (as are Iran and Libya.) This is especially true in an election year, when the need to appear ideologically tough is high. These motivations led the USG to produce an outcome that, while on the surface appearing to have good intentions, will be largely ineffective due to the relative weakness on legal and motivational fronts.
The persistence of ineffective sanctions indicates retributive intention.(42) With respect to Libya, its noncompliance in the face of the Security Resolutions and now the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act seems to indicate that retribution, not rehabilitation, was on the mind of US decision makers.
1 US Congress, 104th Sessio n, H.R. 3107, <gopher://gopher.legislate.com:70/11/bills/104/1/ 10431071> 1996.
2 Dr. Raymond Tanter, notes, PS 472.F96, Iraq1.Doc< http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/Iraq1.txt>.
3 US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Libya, <gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/Publications and Major Reports/Background Notes/Libya>, July 1994.
4 Tanter, notes, 472Not1.Doc, < http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not1.txt>.
5 Tanter, notes, 472Not13.Doc, < http://www-personal.umich. edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not13.txt>.
6 Tanter, notes, 472Not8.Doc, < http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not8.txt&g t;.
7 Tanter, ibid.
8 Tanter, notes, 472Not24.Doc, < http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not24.txt>.
9 Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995,) p. 26.
10 US Army Area Study Handbooks: Libya, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lytoc.html>, 1987.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 US Department of State, Background Notes:Libya.
15 US Army Area Study Handbooks: Libya.
16 US Department of State, _Background Notes:Libya.
17 US Army Area Study Handbooks: Libya.
18 US Department of State, Background Notes:Libya.
19 US Department of State, 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, <http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/index.html>, April 1996.
20 "Huge chemical arms plant near completion in Libya, US says,&quo t; February 24, 1996: Nando.net News Service <http://www.nandotimes.com/ntn/worl d/022496/world6_24990.html>.
21 Congressional Research Service, &q uot;Digest:
H.R. 104.3107,"
<gopher://gopher.legislate.com:70/11/bi
lls/104/1/10431071>.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 "Fact Sheet on Counter-Terrorism," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, <http://docs.whitehouse.gov/white-house- publications/1996/04/1996-04-30-fact-sheet-on-counter-terrorism.text>, April 30, 199 6.
25 "Fact Sheet on American Security: President Clinton's Comprehensive Strategy to Fight Terrorism," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, <http://docs.whitehouse.gov/white-house- publications/1996/08/1996-08-05-strategy-to-fight-terrorism-fact-sheet-.text>, August 5, 1996.
26 "Fact Sheet on Clinton Administration Counter-Terrorism, International Anti-Crime, drug trafficking, Counternarcotics, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Initiatives," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, <http://docs.whitehouse.gov/white-house-publications/1996/09/1996-09-24- fact-sheet-on-international-security.text>, September 24, 1996.
27 Will iam J. Perry, "Remarks as Delivered by the Secretary of Defense," <http://www.dtic.mil:80>, April 23, 1996.
28 This military reorganization is discussed (and heavily criticized) in Klare's book. For purposes of this section of the paper, it is only important to note that Defense has indeed reorganized its entire structure to engage rogue threats.
29 Barry Carter, International Economic Sanctions: I mproving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p 191.
30 Tanter, notes, 472Law4.Doc, < http://www-personal .umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472law4.txt>.
31 Omer Yousif Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) p. 111.
33 "Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 1996," by the Directorate General for External Relations, European Commission, <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg01/tbrfinal.htm>, May 1996.
34 Steven Erlanger, "Turkey-Iran Gas Deal: A Test of U.S. Law on Terror?" New York Times, August 13, 1996, p. A7.
35 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1985) p. 79.
37 US Army Area Study Handbooks: Libya.
38 See the comments made in the White House press release of August 5, 1996, cited in note 25.
39 Dr. Raymond Tanter, PS 472.F96, Confer electronic discussion forum, item 89. <telnet://confer.rs.itd.umich.edu/ps472/item89>.
40 Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, forthcoming, 1997. <http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/rogue/iran.chapter.htm.>
41 Ibid.